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Assessing the effectiveness of these export promotion services is, however, a more complex issue. 
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of unfair competition in the international markets. 
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Export financial flows, whether direct or insured, are vital for the 
smooth functioning of the international trading system and all major exporting 
countries, including all the E.C. economies, have established national schemes 
to assist and protect exporters by providing financial and insurance 
facilities to reduce both the costs and risks involved in exporting. 
Assessing the .effectiveness of these export promotion services is, 
however, a complex l.ssue. Some recent government reports have suggested 
uncertainty about support program effects on user firms and have highlighted 
the lack of clear evaluation criteria for such programs2 • Even some doubts 
have arisen about the costs of such policies and the significance of the 
benefits obtained. Furthermore, some countries have viewed with growing 
concern the funding and public involvement in export finance as a new form of 
unfair competition in the international markets. 
Export finance is considered to be subsidized whenever credit or 
insurance is provided on better terms than is available in a competitive 
market (lower premia or interest rates). The impact and level of subsidies on 
export finance has been assessed since the well known works of G. Dhlin (1964)
and J. Pincus (1965) and they imply, one way or another, government
intervention3 • 
GATT and EC regulations, however, allow government agencies to provide 
export insurance at a lower premium rate than the market rate if no long term 
operating losses are incurred and competition between Community members is not 
distorted. Public policy-makers in Europe face, then, a basic challenge in 
supporting firms' export-related needs and targeting their limited resources 
to those specific requirements. 
The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to evaluate the role and cost 
of public subsidies of Export Credit Insurance Programs in the DECD countries4 
during the last decade (1981-1991) and is divided into five parts. 
In Section Two, we analyze the basic aspects of Export Credit Insurance 
in DECD countries. Section Three includes a definition of insurance subsidies 
and the methodology and estimation methods used to calculate them, including 
their shortcomings. 
In Section Four we use this methodology to estimate DECD insurance 
results for the last ten years: For all countries of the sample (19 out of 23 
DECD members) both absolute figures and so called rates of subsidization are 
presented. The subsidy rates relate subsidy equivalents to insured and total 
exports. France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, the five 
biggest export insurers in Europe, are studied in more detail and their 
results are presented on an aggregate and time pattern basis. We make, as 
well, a distinction, in the Spanish and French cases, when insurance business 
is conducted on the insurer's own or on the Government' s accO\~:1t. The 
distinction is a relevant one vis a vis subsidy rates. 
Finally, Section Five contains some concluding comments and remarks. 
2 See SeringhBus F.H. Rolf and Rosson. Phillip (1990). 
3 Export Credit subsidies have been evaluated for different countries, incluiding the works 
of R.E. Feinberg (1982). D.P. Baron (1983) and D.F. Kohler (1984) for the U.S.A., A. Raynauld (1984 and 
1985) for Canada, J. Pearce (1980) for the U. Kingdom and E. Pisani (1980) and P. Messerlin (1986) in the 
case of France. among many others. 
4 Messerlin P. (1986) and Melitz J. & Messerlin P. (1987) provided estimates of subsidies in 
export credits and export insurance for France and the United Kingdom. The comission of European 
Communities in a Document (1990). developed a framework and methodology to estimate subsidies on export 
finance, and calculated subsidy equivalents, for Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. 
2 
2.- Export Credit Insurance. 
Export Insurance is an integral part of the export support programs used 
by governments to promote national exports. These export support programs can 
be broadly classified into three main categories: 
-Commercial: Such Information, Market research, Trade fairs, Exhibition 
Centers, etc. 
-Piscal: Including reduced tax rates for exporters, reimbursement of 
VAT, tariff exemptions, etc. 
-Pinancial: Mainly Export Credit, Credit Insurance and Official 
Development Assistance. 
Export finance, considered in a broad sense, includes both credit and 
insurance, and is taken to mean the "set of facilities, usually provided by 
Government agencies, available to an exporter in any country to help and 
reduce the costs and risks involved in his export business'" and includes, 
therefore, a mixture of insurance and banking devices meant as a way to 
increase exports. Credit and credit insurance are accepted by the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the E.C. Commission as a legitimate 
form of export promotion, but not as a form of export subsidy. 
Member countries of the EC are subject, however, to legal constraints 
that are more comprehensive on export credit than those applied to insurance. 
This leaves, therefore," room for export subsidization: International 
agreements only prohibit export financing which eventually entails a charge 
on the public account. 
Export insurers are, in the OECD member countries, both in competition 
and communication with each other through different agreements, specially the 
"Consensus" on Export Credits and the "Berne Union" on Insurance. Although, 
the agencies in the Berne Union share, basically, the same economic objectives 
of export promotion and financial equilibrium, not two national export 
agencies are identical. Each operates in its own commercial and political 
environment (economic and political background, banking and insurance 
facilities, etc.). The flexibility of the agencies varies largely with the 
degree of financial autonomy from their respective governments. 
The finance export systems can be classified in two main groups, 
according to the role played by the public sector: 
- Countries (such the United Kingdom and Germany) where public support 
is restricted to insurance and guarantees, leaving export credits to the 
banking system (Pure cover). 
- Countries (such Belgium, France and Spain) where public institutions 
have been set up to facilitate export credits, in addition to insuring 
agencies (Pinancial Support) . 
The problems faced by exporters and agencies are, however, similar, so 
it is not surprising that many systems have developed common types of 
insurance policies and guarantee facilities. The main risk covered is 
non-payment, and can be either of a political or commercial nature. 
-Political risk arises because of government imposed restrictions on 
foreign currency transactions or any event in the buyer's country that 
prevents it to meet its payment duties. Political events can cover a wide 
range of situations, from war to lack of foreign exchange. 
-Commercial risk occurs because of financial unwillingness or inability 
of the buyer to make payment, such as insolvency or bankruptcy. 
5 The Euromoney Guide to Export Finance (1986), pg.137 
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Most institutions cover both risks and will provide the exporter or its 
bank with some kind of insurance policy anticipating these eventualities. In 
assessing the competitive distortions arising from export insurance subsidies, 
the distinction between state related (political risk) and other activities 
(commercial risk) will be important. 
3.- Export Insurance Subsidies. 
Export credit insurance and the role governmental subsidies play in this 
process is the central focus of this work. Economically speaking export 
financing agencies provide a subsidy whenever exporters obtain more favorable 
terms (cheaper insurance) than are available in a competitive market. 
Official support for export finance (credit and credit insurance) may 
be available through loans extended by a governmental agency, or through the 
provision of insurance and guarantee contracts for financing supplied by 
private creditors. Both forms of cover may involve subsidies. 
An insurance cover. is issued upon the payment of a premium by the 
contract holder, whothen.has a claim on the agency if the repayment of the 
insured credit is delayed or lost for reasons of commercial and/or political 
nature. Under the rules of GATT, premia may not be subsidized. In practice, 
given the limited spread of risks assumed and the delayed periods before the 
losses can be determined, it is difficult to assess whether exports are in 
fact subsidized. 
In the academic literature there is no generally accepted definition of 
export subsidies.The subsidy implied in a governmental export support program 
can be defined in terms of "the benefits to the exporter" or, alternatively, 
the "costs incurred by the government." These two definitions do not 
necessarily yield the same estimates of the subsidy equivalents. Measuring the 
cost to the government eases data gathering and is appropriate when the 
budgetary consequences of a governmental export support program form the main 
concern of the study. When analyzing the effect of an export support program 
on the competitiveness of the firms, the use of the other definition appears 
more appropriate. In this study, a subsidy will be defined as the benefit for 
the firms that results from a governmental export support program. 
Based upon this definition, we analyze the different estimation methods 
that appear in the literature6 : 
Consider an exporter operating in a riskless world with a constant 
marginal and average cost c. He finds a world export price Pw that maximises 
his profits (R). 
(1) 
where x are total exports. 
Confronted with risk, the exporter insures his exports and pays an 
insurance premium. Simultaneously, he increases his export price by h. The 
magnitude of h depends on market conditions. His new contract price becomes: 
6 In this part we will follow the methodology used by the Commission of European Communities 
(Document, 1990, pg. 25-31). 
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(2) 
and his profits will be: 
R=P;X-cx-kP;X (3 ) 
In this equation, k is the percentage insurance premium of the export 
contract. When export insurance is subsidized, the cost of the exporter 
decreases. The new insurance premium becomes, 
k =k-s (4)s 
where s represents the percentage subsidy of the export contract. Profits can 
then be written as: 
R=P;X~cx-(k-s)P;X (5 ) 
(6 ) 
=[P (l-k) -c]x (7 )c s 
When the government supports or organizes an export insurance scheme, 
the cost saving to the firm amounts to the difference between the actual 
insurance contributions and the insurance premia that would have been paid in 
the private market. In effect, the subsidy in year t is defined as: 
(8) 
whereby: 
I = value of insured contracts in year t 
t 
k = pure insurance premium in year t (in percentage terms) 
t 
k = subsidized insurance premium in year t (in percentage terms) 
s,t 
When putting equation (8) to practical use, one first has to measure the 
true market premium, k(t). In insurance theory, the pure premium on a contract 
is defined as?: 
7 See Hogg and Klugman (1984, pg.235) 
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total expected claims 
pure premium = --------------------------- (9 ) 
value of insured contracts 
The pure premium thus guarantees that the premium income exactly offsets 
the expected losses from the insurance contract. 
The market premium exceeds the pure premium because the insurance 
company has to be compensated for the expenses of doing business and taking 
on risk (Agencies' premia for cover for one year credit range from under 1% 
to as much as 15% of the contract value) . Official export insurance companies 
do not systematically charge a fixed percentage of the insured amounts as 
administration costs or/and risk charge. We will ignore both elements in our 
calculations. By doing this, we may underestimate the market premium and 
therefore also the subsidies implicit in export insurance. 
The practical application of this general insurance principle to the 
case of export credit insurance poses some major problems: 
a- At the moment contracts are signed and premiums are paid, one can at 
best guess future expected claims. We distinguish between an ex-post and ex-
ante approach to measuring expected claims. 
In the ex-post appr:oach, we assume that the insurance agency forms 
rational expectations about future claims on the insurance contracts concluded 
in any particular year. A fair premium is charged when premium income covers 
expected claims. The accumulation over time of sustained losses (claims minus 
premia) by the insurance agency is interpreted as an indicator of export 
subsidization. A short-time mismatch between claims and premia is not 
necesserily a subsidy because the insurance agency cannot foresee an 
unanticipated loss. On the other hand, sustained losses cannot be explained 
by expectational errors and therefore point to a deliberate policy of 
subsidization. 
The ex-ante approach attempts to derive subsidy-equivalents on a yearly 
basis by more explicitly modeling expectation formation by an insurance 
agency. More specifically, one first estimates the pure premium which, based 
on the available information, the insurance agency must charge to maintain 
equality between premia and claims. The information set is based on available 
data on past claims and insurance contracts. In this work, the expected pure 
premium of any particular year, k , is computed, for the three most recent 
t 




C = (j = 1, ... ,3) the actual claims in year i-j. These claims can 
i-j be gross or net (.less recuperations) 
V = (j = 1, ... ,3) value of new/outstanding insurance contrats in 
i-j year i-j 
AS a second step, the expected pure premium is multiplied by the value 
of the newly insured contracts of a particular year to obtain expected future 
claims. Consistent with equation (1), the subsidy granted in a year is the 
difference between the premium income necessary to cover expected future 
claims, I ; k , and the actually paid premium income I ; k 
t t t s,t 
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b- A second major problem concerns the timing of premia and loss payments 
and is directly relevant for the measurement of the pure premium. Usually, 
export insurance companies do not have appropriately matched data on premiums, 
claims (& recuperations) and total insured constracts. Due to this lack of 
information, it is not possible to compare the premia and the claims on 
contracts of a particular year. This is unfortunate, because claims take some 
time to materialise, and recuperations may continue long after claims have 
been paid. To solve this problem, information is needed on which part of the 
claims and recuperations of a year are due to contracts concluded in previous 
years. Such information is not available to us. In equation (10), we therefore 
divide claims paid in any particular year by the value of insured contracts 
and oustanding insurance in the same year. This not only mixes stock 
(outstanding contracts) and flow concepts (claims and insured contracts), but 
also causes distortions when the structure of export insurance contracts is 
based towards long term contracts. Fortunately, this problem does not appear 
too serious for our study. 
4.- Export Credit Insurance in the OECD countries. 
A substantial chan~e in many public agencies involved in export 
insurance has taken place since 1982, when debtors started experiencing 
serious payment difficulties. Debt reschedulings and the resulting heavy 
claims payments by the agencies have caused, since then, an unprecedent 
deterioration in their financial position, leading to huge technical losses. 
In the 1990' s many agencies belonging to OECD countries are still 
suffering strong financial pressures due to record claims payments that 
exceeded by far the sum of premium incomes and recoveries. However, in spite 
of difficulties, there have been relatively few changes in premium rates since 
the increase in the 1982-1984 period, and therefore total premium income has 
remained low due to the decline in business volume. The agencies do not 
consider premia as a major measure to limit exposure. Although some of them 
maintain a premium structure directly linked to country-risk, most agencies 
do not discriminate premium across countries. 
Premium incomes have two main elements: Basic insurance and the 
surcharge, which depends on risk, length of term and the amount of the 
contract. Surcharges that would fully compensate, according to insurance 
principles, for high risk contracts and countries would be too high and 
politically impracticable. 
In order to improve their financial position, most agencies are trying 
to become more active on the debt recovery, whether through direct 
negotiations with private firms or countries or by means of debt rescheduling 
through the Paris Club or similar agreements. 
How losses are recovered depends, however, on the organizational form 
of the institutions providing insurance or finance in each country. Some 
private organizations act both on behalf of governments and on their own 
account, depending on the kind of risk taken (commercial or political) . 
The solutions are reflected in the degree of financial autonomy of the 
agencies that sometimes are required to be self-sufficient, at least in the 
medium term, while others are supported by the national budget and therefore 
face fewer immediate financial constraints. The kind of risk taken then 
makes, a big difference when subsidies are considered. 
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Based on the yearly reports of the Berne Union8 , we computed the export 
insurance subsidies using both the ex-post and ex-ante approach. As explained 
in the methological part of this paper, the ex-post approach assumes that 
export insurance gives rise to export subsidies when the insurance premia do 
not fully cover subsequent claims. One way to carry out this principle is to 
subtract for each year total premia (table 1) from total claims (table 3) I as 
is done in table 4. 
Recall that, using this ex-post methology, the yearly figures should not 
be interpreted as subsidies for that particular year. Only the accumulation 
of losses over a sustained period of time forms an indication of export 
subsidization. Also, administrative and other costs of the official export 
insurance are ignored. In the same way as a private insurer, the official 
agency must recover these costs from its premia in order to break even. This 
implies that our estimates provide a lower bound for the subsidies actually 
provided. 
Tables 5,6 and 7,8 express the difference between premia and claims as 
a percentage of the value of insured contracts and total exports. In this 
context, it should be noted that OECD agencies usually provide export 
insurance to all countries, so that total exports are the relevant concept to 
compute subsidization rates. 
Tables 5 and 7 take into account the recoveries (2) on claims (3) which 
leads to lower estimates of subsidy-equivalents. Nevertheless, these 
recoveries should be inte~preted with considerable caution, as they often 
consist of reimbursements by the Treasury irrespective of whether funds were 
actually recovered. These reimbursements compensate for losses because of the 
debt consolidations with the Club of Rome and, therefore, represent subsidies. 
Therefore the improved financial situation is sometimes presumably ficticious. 
Tables 9a,b and 10a,b use the ex-ante approach of measuring insurance 
subsidies. In reality, official as well as private insurance agencies can make 
mistakes. Optimally, an ex-ante approach is required to compute the subsidy-
equivalents of export insurance during a specific year. This approach compares 
the premia to the future claims that can be expected at the time the export 
insurance contract is signed. Here again, the time horizon of the studies may 
be too short to judge the long-run profitability of the official export 
insurance system. Consequently, the estimates of export insurance subsidies 
should be treated with care9 • 
It is comforting to see that the ex-ante and ex-post measures reported 
in tables 5 to 8, 9 and 10 display a similar pattern, although the ex-ante 
procedure leads to lower estimates of the subsidization involved. In the 
period 1981-1992, premia did not cover the costs of agencies' activities, on 
average, so that subsidization took place. This represents a clear change from 
the preceding period (1973-1981), when the cost of export insurance was 
largely covered by premia and other activities. 
8 Data is from "Trade Finance World Export Guide", 1992, Euromoney Publications plc. 
9 Certain alowances must be made when interpreting the agencies'results. It is difficult to 
compare one agency's performance with another's because the individual structures vary widely. Agencies can 
be privately or publicy owned, or a mixture of the two. They can also act as export banks. 
Accounting methods may also differ; income for the premium may be collected at the beginning or 
during the life of the risk, and provisions against losses vary greately. A massive claim can distort an 
otherwise sound underlying trend, while the gap between premium income and claims may reflect not one factor 
but two: premia collected on a lower level of current business, while claims are being paid on a higher 
level of past activity. A high level of current recoveries could simply reflect a high level of claims one, 
two or more years previously, or a compensation of losses by government authorities. 
The relationship between debt rescheduling and recoveries is also rather ambiguous. In some cases 
this can be used to camuflage, rather than cure the problem. The banks aaumme the debt from the agency but 
they are then reinsured again. Differences, then, exist in the amount of governmental support given, in the 
types of business covered and in the policies offered. 
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Tables 9 and 10 show a steady increase in export insurance subsidies in 
the mid and late 1980's, although there is more yearly variation in the case 
of ex-post subsidies and a time lag (between 2 and 3 years). In effect, we 
find that export insurance subsidies exceded 2% of exports for some agencies 
(Spain, France and Austria) using the ex-post approach. Ex-ante only France 
and Spain surpass the 2% mark in the early 1990' s. When recoveries are 
considered only Spain approaches the 2% level (1.8% ex-post in 1987 and 1.5% 
in 1990). 
On the other hand, the estimates, in terms of the value of insured 
contracts, show that one shoud not underestimate the possible competitive 
effects of export insurance subsidies. The difference between claims and 
premia as percentage of insured contracts steadily rise, on average, to almost 
3% in the period 1983-85, then jumps to 4% in 1986 and then nearly 7% in 1987-
88. Including recoveries, the subsidy approach yields estimates of 2% in 1986 
and more than 4.5% in 1988. In view of the increase in claims (and recoveries) 
in the 90's, these subsidy rates will increase even further after 1992 because 
the fair premium in the ex-ante subsidy approach is based on a weighted 
average of past claims and premia. 
This is not an unusual situacion, as export insurance is being 
subsidized almost everywhere. Tables 5 to 10 show the level of subsidy for 
export insurance public agencies in France, Germany and United Kingdom. The 
implicit ex-post subsidies are not as high as in the Spanish or Italian cases 
(around 20%) and only exceptionally reached levels of 10% in Germany (1990). 
When the implicit subsidy is calculated as a percentage of total exports 
(without recoveries); France also happened to be a major subsidizer (along 
with Italy and Spain) at levels of around 2% of total exports. 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom are, among, the 
biggest insurers in Europe. However, when we take into account the level of 
insurance subsidies, Norway and Switzerland registered levels, including 
recoveries, of 5% or more, in the last ten years. Other agencies, like Japan 
and the United States, provide almost no subsidies on average and, Canada and 
Portugal even registered a small surplus. 
4.1 Political and Commercial Risk. 
The main risk covered by export insurance is non-payment. However, a 
distinction has to be made when the risk is of sovereign (a public or private 
buyer with a public guarantee) or corporate nature. The former Political Risk, 
is covered on behalf of the exporting government and in the second case 
(Commercial Risk) the agencies act, very often, on their own account. 
Tables 11 and 12 show Spanish (CESCE) and French (COFACE) results when 
agencies operate on their own account and when on behalf of their governments. 
With some variations across the years, it is seen that on average from 60%-70% 
of contracts insured by CESCE are concluded on behalf of the Spanish 
government. Very interestingly, we find that, except for years 1986 to 1988, 
premium income of CESCE's own insurance contracts sligtly exceeds claims in 
years considered. As the surplus in premium income may be needed to cover 
administrative costs, this suggests that CESCE own activities are aproximately 
breaking even. 
The contrast with the government account is remarkable. Here persistent 
and rapidly rising export subsidization is found since the mid 1980's with 
levels as high as 20 to 25% of exports insured for political risk in 1987. In 
summary, export insurance subsidies are entirely government related in Spain 
and, as a result, the large share of government insurance contracts (for 
political risks) explains the observed accumulation of losses by CESCE. 
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When we put toghether the Spanish and French cases, a very similar 
picture emerges. Table 12 shows the difference between claims and premia in 
France, as well as the shares of subsidies for the French State's and 
COFACE's own account. There are striking similarities in the level of subsidy 
to the Spanish case when the agency operate for the State (political risk) and 
on its own account. In the first case, the subsidy level increases to almost 
24% in France in 1988, and when COFACE insures its own risk the small surplus, 
once general expenses are deducted, will make COFACE very close to break-even. 
5.- Conclusions. 
The evaluation of public export promotion programs is still in its 
infancy, although increasing globalization of markets is making this topic one 
of growing concern to managers, governments and researchers. Focus on export 
credit insurance is of considerable importance for three reasons: 
-First, the globalization of the marketplace requires many firms 
to have some kind of international involvement, and export finance has made 
a substantial contribution to facilitating the huge growth of international 
trade in the last three de~ades, 
-Second, many industrial nations (OECD countries among them) offer 
numerous export assistance services, including public export insurance 
support, aimed at motivating and helping firms to enter foreign markets. 
-Third, the impact of export promotion must be viewed, as well, 
from a cost-benefit perspective in order to provide public policy makers with 
feedback on the usefulness of programs. 
Export insurance agencies are expected to be financially self-supporting 
over the medium term. However, many agencies operate, both on their own and 
on their respective State's account, and with the emergence in the mid-1980's 
of widespread debt servicing difficulties in developing countries, most 
agencies experienced large technical losses for government export insured 
contracts (political risk) as claims payments increased sharply while premium 
income declined, reflecting the reduction in the flow of new commitments. 
These cash-flows deficits, increasingly financed from government 
budgets, led agencies to reduce the basis of their operations. Agencies now 
generally adjust cover contract premia to reflect the financial strength of 
individual importers and the quality of public supporting guarantees, and both 
ex-post and ex-ante results have considerably improved in the last few years. 
Subsidies on exports insured have been increasing, on average, from 
almost nothing to 2-3% in 1991, with peak levels of almost 7% in the mid 80's. 
Italy and Spain provided significantly higher insurance subsidies (from 20 to 
25% in 1987-88) than did France, Germany or the United Kingdom, although 
German export subsidies have increased in the 1990' s, following German 
reunification. 
The implicit subsidies in credit insurance are not all that large when 
related to total export values. Rates of subsidization are generally well 
below 1%, except for France and Spain, where subsidies increased to more than 
2% of total exports in the mid 1980' s (and in the 1990' s in the ex-ante 
approach) . 
In assessing the competitive distortions arising from export insurance 
subsidies, the distinction between state-related and other activities was 
found to be important. In the last decade or so, Spanish and French export 
subsidization rates have been significantly higher for contracts insured on 
behalf of the respective governments. 
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In spite of the apparently low rates of subsidization, there are several 
reasons for not disregarding the possible competitive effects of export 
insurance subsidies thoughtlessly: As Fleising and Hill (1983, p. 3) have 
pointed out: 
-Borrowers cannot lose from accepting export credit 
subsidies and lenders cannot gain from giving them" 
The estimate of insurance subsidies does not consider administrative and 
other costs of the official insurance agency and therefore underestimates the 
implicit subsidy. More importantly, our results indicate that the subsidy 
given on insured contracts is considerably higher than the subsidy on exports. 
This suggests that the export contracts that are actually insured may benefit 
substantially from official insurance subsidies. In addition, the rates of 
insurance subsidization have started to rise rapidly in the early eighties and 
there is no evidence that this pattern will be reversed soon. Unlike the 
sixties and seventies, official insurance agencies now accumulate sustained 
losses because premia have not been adjusted to the riskier international 
environment. It is not very likely that future recoveries will be sufficient 
to compensate past losses. If this trend continues, the role of export 
insurance subsidies may become significantly more important in the coming 
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EXPORT CREDIT I~SURA~CE PERFORMA~CE I~ THE OECD COU~TRIES (Values fn Million US$) 
Table 1 
PREMIUM 
COON TRY AGENCY 1981 1982 1983 19&4 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 TOTAL 
AUSTRALIA EFIC 12,90 11,30 10,10 11,10 15,00 14,90 18,60 32,60 29,40 24,40 18,10 198,4 
AUSTRIA OKB 64,40 81,90 72,20 87,50 104,50 123,70 196,90 177,80 251,50 241,30 208,60 1610,3 
BELGIUM ONO 53,90 32,80 33,20 24,00 28,30 31,40 44,90 41,20 58,10 49,50 65,90 463,2 
CANADA EDC 12,30 12,70 17,90 15,50 11,80 12,60 15,40 19,70 22,00 22,90 25,90 188,7 
DENMARK EKR 12,00 11,10 12,70 11,60 16,80 25,40 32,40 25,50 27,11 MA ~A 174,6 
FINLAND VTL 13,60 11,00 10,60 6,00 4,60 4,60 17,30 17,10 25,80 38,80 MA 149,4 
FRANCE COFACE 331,90 336,20 360,50 376,20 448,10 569,90 530,70 381,70 534,50 469,80 481,10 4820,6 
GERMANY HERMES 247,40 299,20 222,80 172,60 248,90 261,50 310,90 269,50 336,70 496,70 830,60 3696,8 
ITALY SACE 133,40 142,60 111,20 111,40 105,50 120,00 141,00 108,40 149,50 180,00 163,40 1466,4 
JAPAN EID 148,90 150,00 143,40 165,50 230,70 171,70 MA MA 241,10 315,80 267,60 1834,7 
~ETHERLD. ~CM 79,60 76,20 69,70 65,20 74,40 81,50 90,90 62,10 190,80 222,90 !lA 1013,3 
~.ZEALAND EXGO 2,30 2,40 2,40 2,00 1,40 2,00 2,50 2,20 2,02 1,91 1,69 22,8 
~ORIIAY GIEK 15,40 13,70 10,70 7,50 6,50 6,30 5,20 5,50 7,90 5,60 NA 84,3 
PORTUGAL COSEC ~A 4,00 9,00 5,00 6,00 4,70 ~A NA !lA NA ~A 28,7 
SPAIN CESCE 81,80 123,10 56,20 41,20 63,00 50,50 29,63 49,13 36,91 68,46 136,86 736,8 
SIlEOEII EKN 43,80 41,60 41,50 35,90 39,00 51,00 48,70 57,60 54,00 49,40 34,20 496,7 
SIIITZERl. ERG 69,80 59,60 42,60 32,50 25,50 36,00 25,50 22,50 33,60 39,60 IIA 387,2 
U.KINGOOM ECGO 475,30 608,70 259,60 240,10 252,00 252,30 222,00 248,90 370,70 341,20 NA 3270,8 
U.S.A. FCIA 25,00 26,30 20,3D 21,60 22,40 22,20 20,30 28,50 26,40 22,80 30,00 265,8 
TOTAL 1823,70 2044,40 1506,60 1432,40 1704,40 1&42,20 1752,83 1549,93 2398,04 2591,07 2263,95 20909,5 
AVERAGE 101,32 107,60 79,29 75,39 89,71 96,96 103,11 91,17 133,22 152,42 188,66 1218,8 
Table 2 
RECOVERIES 
COU~TRY "GE~:Y 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 TOTAL 
AUSTRALI A Ef IC 3,10 6,10 7,70 11,70 2,80 1,90 4,30 26,90 7,90 19,30 5,8 97,5 
AUSTRIA OK6 14,00 48,60 55,50 89,70 1",30 130,90 128,50 76,50 99,50 87,90 125,9 1001,3 
BELGIU'"'. O~:> 18,90 26,30 29,30 38,40 28,70 75,90 72,50 58,90 61,60 92,70 130,9 634,1 
CA~ADA EDC 0,20 1,70 4,50 10,50 11,50 2,70 14,50 36,10 16,60 4,30 11,7 114,3 
OENMAH EKR 4,10 3,50 15,60 11,20 1,20 10,60 37,60 20,50 10,30 NA NA 114,6 
FINLAWD VTL 3,30 5,70 7,00 18,00 14,70 16,50 30,60 53,60 43,30 166,10 NA 358,8 
FRANCE COFACE 364,10 259,50 247,30 610,10 950,10 762,30 1871,70 772,00 1861,10 1553,10 1396,5 10647,8 
GERMANY HERMES 25,70 106,90 40,80 20,00 145,80 241,10 243,60 132,10 176,70 249,80 243,9 1626,4 
ITAL Y SACE 33,20 140,50 50,00 145,10 123,90 345,00 354,30 175,30 107,20 1212,60 570 3257,1 
JAPAN EID 24,70 49,50 63,90 102,60 192,20 317,10 NA !lA 487,70 272,40 305,5 1815,6 
NETHERLO. NCM 24,40 28,10 57,50 46,40 71,20 74,40 169,30 203,70 90,60 102,70 NA 868,3 
N.ZEALAWD EXGO 0,17 0,45 0,29 0,20 0,20 0,13 0,33 1,23 0,20 0,35 0,48 4,0 
NORIIAY GIEK 4,00 10,30 34,50 43,80 41,00 31,20 27,20 42,30 57,20 34,20 NA 325,7 
PORTUGAL COSEC NA 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,10 NA NA NA NA NA 0,1 
SPAIN tEscE 10,30 39,10 39,60 35,80 102,50 131,20 148,39 238,53 154,56 195,43 206,53 1301,9 
SIlEOEN EKII 21,20 29,40 38,20 39,70 41,20 77,70 84,10 50,90 67,60 46,60 79,5 576,1 
Sill TZE RL. ERG 21,20 14,20 19,90 36,00 25,30 5,80 8,20 10,50 9,40 15,15 NA 165,7 
U.KINGDOM ECGD 160,00 181,10 201,10 458,50 292,30 623,20 508,90 570,50 638,60 689,20 NA 4323,4 
U.S.A. FCIA 4,70 7,00 69,90 18,70 22,30 56,40 102,00 42,30 12,90 48,40 39,2 423,8 
TOTAL 737,27 957,95 982,59 1736,40 2211,20 2904,13 3806,02 2511,86 3902,96 4790,23 3115,91 27656,5 
AVERAGE 40,96 50,42 51,72 91,39 116,38 152,85 223,88 147,76 216,83 281,78 259,66 1633,6 
NA: ~ct AliBi lable 
Source: Trede Finance and own computations. 
.-------_ ....__ . __._----_... _-_._------_. 
EXPORT CREDIT INSURANCE PERFORMANCE IN THE OECD COUNTRIES (Values In Million USS) 
Table 3 
CLAIMS 
COUNTRY AGENCY 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 TOTAL 
AUST RAL! A EF IC 8,10 6,10 13,50 14,20 2,80 10,70 44,90 329,00 15,90 22,40 295,8 763,4 
AUSTRIA OKB 14,90 174,30 154,20 199,50 115,20 443,90 83,00 266,40 207,00 483,10 375,3 2516,8 
BElGIUM ONO 75,40 94,10 133,00 137,60 134,60 175,87 260,00 249,00 228,20 253,10 235,7 1976,6 
CANADA EDC 6,00 7,40 26,30 15,00 10,90 3,30 18,00 32,10 19,60 24,30 11,8 174,7 
DENMARK HR 25,40 33,30 62,80 44,90 16,90 118,80 192,80 134,60 62,20 iliA !lA 691,7 
FINLAND VTL 23,20 27,20 35,70 40,50 34,40 65,10 78,20 48,20 148,00 111,40 !lA 677,9 
FRANCE COFACE 700,20 964,90 1139,80 994,30 1148,30 2011,50 3524,50 3012,90 3741,20 3845,00 3316,8 24399,4 
GERMANY HERMES 340,90 332,10 611,00 605,00 704,90 969,30 1467,70 1121,80 1671,10 3239,20 2900,6 13963,6 
!TAL Y SACE 185,60 374,70 501,50 538,80 840,60 890,10 1121,00 1222,40 1875,00 1700,00 1n7,0 10976,7 
JAPAN EID 170,70 251,90 338,80 567,20 809,90 1124,20 iliA iliA 1004,60 1339,40 2565,1 8171,8 
NET HERLD. NCM 58,20 95,50 268,00 318,40 289,30 301,70 413,80 401,70 460,90 522,40 NA 3129,9 
N_ZEALA~D EXGO 1,44 2,15 2,13 1,81 0,40 1,00 2,60 1,35 1,37 5,85 3,2 23,3 
NORIIAY GIEK 33,90 87,60 143,10 87,70 65,70 95,30 86,10 102,80 94,40 91,16 NA 887,8 
PORTUG"L COSEC NA 0,46 7,00 2,00 0,90 0,00 NA iliA iliA NA NA 10,4 
SPAIN CESCE 55,60 119,50 139,00 213,90 285,10 499,80 894,04 715,24 6n,92 707,76 709,9 5012,8 
SIIEDH £KN 126,30 131,70 115,30 93,70 98,80 152,20 189,30 135,50 167,80 170,70 174,0 1555,3 
SIIITZERl. ERG 153,60 177,30 166,20 167,60 .149,30 137,80 227,30 105,90 137,70 138,00 NA 1580,7 
U.KINGO()l; ECGO 609,40 1021,20 1011,10 1193,90 1003,70 1232,10 1559,00 1747,50 1589,00 1659,80 NA 12626,7 
U.S.A. FC!A 19,60 34,30 193,00 306,90 112,10 52,70 168,40 40,40 62,10 13,60 49,6 1052,7 
TOTAL 2608,44 3935,71 5081,43 5542,91 5823,80 8285,37 10330,64 9666,79 12158,99 14393,17 12364,77 90192,0 
AVERAGE 144,91 207,14 267,44 291,73 306,52 436,07 607,68 568,63 675,50 846,66 1030,40 5382,7 
Tab le 4 
LOSSES 
COV~H\ ~:;E~:\ 1981 1982 1983 19s.. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 TOTAL 
AUS TRAL H EFJC -7,90 -11,30 -4,30 -8,60 -15,00 -6,10 22,00 269,50 -21,40 -21, 30 271.90 467,5 
A:':STR l~ OK5 -63,50 43,80 26,50 22,30 -133,60 189,30 -242,40 12,10 -144,00 153,90 40,80 -94,8 
BELGIU~ O~~ 2,60 35,00 70,50 75,20 77,60 68,57 142,60 148,90 108,50 110,90 38,90 879,3 
CA~ADA EDC -6,50 ·7,00 3,90 -11,00 -12,40 -12,00 -11,90 -23,70 -19,00 -2,90 '25,80 -128,3 
DE ~~.ARK £KR 9,30 18,70 34,50 22,10 -1,10 82,80 122,80 88,60 24,79 NA NA 402,5 
FnLA~O VTl 6,30 10,50 18,10 16,50 15,10 44,00 30,30 -22,50 78,90 -27,50 NA 169,7 
FRANCE CO FACE 4,20 369,20 532,00 8,00 -249,90 679,30 1122,10 1859,20 1345,60 1822,10 1439,20 8931,0 
GERMAn HER~ES 67,80 -74,00 347,40 412,40 310,20 466,70 913,20 720,20 1157,70 2492,70 1826,10 WO,4 
IT"LY SACE 19,00 91,60 340,30 282,30 611,20 425,10 625,70 938,70 1618,30 307,40 993,60 6253,2 
JAPA~ EID -2,90 52,40 131,50 299,10 387,00 635,40 NA NA 275,80 751,20 1992,00 4521,5 
NETHERLO. NCM -45,80 -8,80 140,80 206,80 143,70 145,80 153,60 135,90 179,50 196,80 NA 124S, 3 
N.ZEAL"~D EXGO -1,03 -0,70 -0,56 -0,39 -1,20 -1,13 -0,23 -2,08 ·0,85 3,59 0,98 -3,6 
NORII"Y Gm: 14,50 63,60 97,90 36,40 18,20 57,80 53,70 55,00 29,30 51,36 NA 477,8 
PORTUGAL cOSEc NA -3,54 -2,00 '3,00 -5,10 -4,80 NA NA NA NA NA - le,4 
SPAIN CESCE -36,50 -42,70 43,20 136,90 119,60 318,10 716,02 427,58 481,45 443,87 366,53 2974,1 
SIIEDEN EKN 61,30 60,70 35,60 18,10 18,60 23,50 56,50 27,00 46,20 74,70 60,30 482,5 
Sill TZERl. ERG 62,60 103,50 123,70 99,10 98,50 96,00 193,60 72,90 94,70 83,25 NA 1027,9 
U,KINGDOOI ECGD -25,90 231,40 550,40 495,30 459,40 356,60 828,10 928,10 579,70 629,40 NA 5032,5 
U.S.A. FCIA -10,10 1,00 102,80 266,60 67,40 -25,90 46,10 -30,40 22,80 -57,60 -19,60 363,1 
TOUL 47,5 933,4 2592,2 2374,1 1908,2 3539,0 4771,8 5605,0 5858,0 7011,9 6984,9 41626,0 
AVERAGE 2,6 49,1 136,4 125,0 100,4 166,3 280,7 329,7 344,6 438,2 582,1 2575,1 
",,: ~~t "vai table 
Source: Trade Finance and own computations. 
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EXPORT INSURA~CE SUBSIDIES 





































































































































































































SPAIN eESCE -0,79 -0,85 1,26 5,33 3,73 9,69 20,21 10,95 9,79 6,72 4,61 6,07 
Sl/ECE ~ Ek:~ 2,90 3,70 2,93 1,97 1,57 1,54 3,29 1,36 2,89 5,94 4,01 2,90 
SO/ITZEH. EH 1,95 6,37 . 4,64 6,20 7,62 6,59 16,55 6,40 5,68 4,73 NA 5,80' 
U.U~GD~ ECCD -0,07 0,69 2,04 2,02 2,04 1,67 3,51 3,50 2,19 2,20 IlA 1,87 
L.S.A. FCIA . D, '2 0,0' 1,37 3,9' 0,72 -0,58 o,n -0,59 0,52 -1,18 -0,42 C,53 
AVER~GE 0,02 0,49 ',55 ',73 , , '9 2,'33 3,83 4,54 2,' 1 2, '2 2,27 , ,9' 
h~\e e 
( .,t.~~t _e:c,e,ies) 
EX· f:'S' 
EXPO~l I~S~<AI,:E SJ8SlDIES 
cc,~,~'" wv t ~E ~: ( '9 e\ 1982 '983 '98~ 1;85 19s.t '987 '9S8 '989 ,~~. .", . , ;;j AvHAG: 
AJSH~.IA Efl C -0,20 -0,23 0,' 5 O,1S -0,49 -C,1: o,eo 6,37 -0,28 -O,C5 6,55 ',33 




























CL,~~:/" ECC -0,24 -0,29 0,27 -0,02 -0,05 -0,47 0,10 0,36 -0,06 0,03 -0,32 -C,e6 
DE ~"',t,K En 0,37 0,83 1,34 1,00 C,OO 1,74 2,54 toA to'A tiA IiA 1,12 
fl~LA~O VTl 0,90 1,42 2,87 4,34 5,17 9,34 5,67 3,67 8,45 9,05 t.A 5,09 
FHhCE COFACE 0,93 1,79 2,2' 2,76 2,47 5,58 9,57 7,78 7,81 8,35 5,36 4,~6 
GER~A~Y ~ER~H 0,58 0,20 2,98 4,24 3,69 5,45 7,50 6,10 7,23 10,27 5,48 ',U 
ITALY SACE 0,48 2,57 8,01 10,05 12,30 18,94 17 ,55 22,23 16,60 10,60 E,99 11,67 
JAPAN [ID 0,04 0,19 0,42 0,97 1,12 1,94 tiA IiA 0,59 0,64 1,40 0,6' 
tiE HERlD. tiCioI -0,30 0,25 2,53 3,58 3,22 2,40 2,54 2,62 ',67 ',42 kA 1,99 
Ii. 2E Al A~O EXGO -0,13 -0,04 -0,05 00,04 00,18 •0,19 0,02 -0,15 00,13 0,8' 0,32 C,C2 
1l0Ro/AY GIEK 2,77 13,09 21,20 17,51 10,91 '6,28 11,45 13,94 11,12 , 1,1 I toA 12,94 
PORTUCAl COSEC toA -0,69 ·0,29 -0,60 -0,91 -e,M IIA NA tlA tiA ~A -O,~ 
SPAIN CESCE ·0,57 -0,07 2,42 6,n 6,92 13,69 24,40 17,06 12,94 9,68 7,2' 9,13 
SO/EDEN HII 3,90 5,50 6,08 6,30 5,06 ~,62 8,19 3,91 7,11 9,64 ~,30 6,5' 
SilITZERl. HG 2,61 7,24 5,38 e,45 9,57 6,99 17,25 7,32 6,24 5,60 H 7,b6 
U.KI~CO~ EeGO 0,38 1,24 2,79 3,90 ~,33 US 5,67 5,65 4,60 4,6' hA 3,e7 
l!.S.A. fCI~ '0,07 0,12 2,30 4,18 O,9~ (,69 2,31 0,23 0,82 -0,19 e,42 1, C7 
A":RAGE 0, '3 7 1,00 '2,13 3,00 U8 4,2 4 6,e9 6,57 3,5' 3,57 3,28 3, '8 
.....~.. : to-:t A'2)la:"tc 
SOuICE; Tra::Jc f i rlJo,ce e ,d c .. r , co,...pvtat;c"~, 




EXPORT INSURAMCE SUBSIDIES 
CooNTRY AGENCY 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 AVERAGE 
AUSTRALIA EFIC -0,043 -0,058 -0,023 -0,036 -0,067 -0,027 0,080 0,753 -0,048 -0,045 0,527 0,145 
AUSTRIA OKB -0,405 0,339 0,253 0,201 -0,928 1,426 - 1,318 0,059 -0,357 0,400 0,102 -0,041 
BELGIUM OWD 0,005 0,067 0,137 0,144 0,124 0,087 0,153 0,166 0,098 0,086 0,030 0,099 
CANADA EDC -0,008 -0,008 0,004 -0,011 -0,014 -0,011 -0,007 -0,023 -0,020 -0,002 -0,019 
-0,011 
DENMARK HR 0,061 0,171 0,221 0,156 -0,006 0,354 0,428 MA MA MA MA 0,324 
FINLAND VTL 0,045 0,080 0,145 0,125 0,110 0,272 0,135 -0,106 0,327 -0,120 MA 0,097 
FRANCE COFACE 0,003 0,347 0,512 0,009 -0,220 0,605 0,804 1,264 0,754 1,126 0,726 0,600 
GERMANY HERMES 0,039 -0,042 0,205 0,267 0,146 0,172 0,272 0,237 0,270 0,364 0,275 0,256 
ITALY SACE 0,025 0,125 0,538 0,518 0,685 0,439 0,269 1,068 1,121 0,180 0,583 0,495 
JAPAN EID -0,002 0,038 0,085 0,191 0,183 0,297 MA MA 0,074 0,195 0,562 0,198 
NETHERLD. IICM -0,067 -0,013 0,215 0,287 0,219 0,181 0,148 0,133 0,143 0,133 NA 0,137 
I/o ZEALAND EXGO -0,015 -0,012 -0,009 -0,009 -0,022 -0,020 -0,003 -0,027 -0,012 0,031 0,009 -0,005 
IIOlllolAY GIEK 0,080 0,361 0,549 0,191 0,185 0,529 0,425 0,394 0,136 0,240 \lA 0,312 
PORTUGAL COSEC IIA 
-0,"6 -0,043 -0,058 -0,085 -0,066 MA NA NA NA \lA -0,077 
SPAIN CESCE -0,178 . 0,205 0,218 0,629 0,447 1,105 1,8'9 1,040 0,872 0,746 0,585 0,775 
SIiEOEN EKl/ 0,215 0,226 0, '29 0,06' 0,055 0,05' 0,132 0,045 0,10' 0,148 0,120 0,106 
SlilTZERL. ERG 0,219 0,407 0,482 0,384 0,358 0,23' 0,331 0, '47 0,142 0,123 NA 0,264 
U.KINGD~ ECGD -0,027 0,235 0,605. 0,5'2 0,474 0,330 0,716 0,714 0,409 0,572 NA 0,581 
U.S.A. FC!A -0,004 0,000 0,051 0,098 0,032 -0,012 0,018 -0,015 0,0'3 -0,030 -0,0'0 0,015 




EXPORT INSURANCE SUBSIDIES 
C()J~TRY A~E ~ er 1981 19E2 1983 1984 1985 1986 '967 1988 1969 1990 1991 AVERAGE 
AJSTRALIA EFIC -0,026 -0,027 0,016 0,013 -0,055 -0,019 0,096 0,828 -0,030 -0,004 0,536 0,140 
AJSTRIA OK6 -0,316 0,714 0,784 1,010 0,074 2,4' 1 -0,620 0,435 -0,110 0,629 0,417 0,500 
BELGIUM O~':,) 0,039 0,117 0,194 0,216 0,170 0, '84 0,231 0,23' 0,154 0, '58 0, '29 0, '72 
CA~AOA EDC -0,007 -0,006 0,009 0,000 -0,00' -0,009 0,00' 0,0'2 -0,003 0,00' -0,0'0 -0,002 
DENMARK EKR 0,088 0,203 0,32' 0,235 0,001 0,399 0,559 NA HA !lA !lA 0,259 
FINLAND ViL 0,068 0, '24 0,201 0,260 0,217 0,373 0,272 0,147 0,507 0,606 IIA 0,291 
FRAl/CE COfACE 0,299 0,591 0,750 0,663 0,617 1,283 2,144 1,790 1,796 2,086 1,431 1,286 
GERMAl/Y HER ME S 0,053 0,019 0,229 0,260 0,214 0,262 0,345 0,281 0,31' 0,401 0,312 0,279 
ITALY SACE 0,069 0,317 0,617 0,784 0,824 0,796 0,421 1,267 1,195 0,890 0,917 0,847 
JAPAN EIO 0,014 0,073 0,127 0,256 0,273 0,445 NA NA 0,206 0,266 0,649 0,269 
NETHERLO. NCM -0,03' 0,029 0,303 0,351 0,328 0,273 0,310 0,332 0,216 0,202 NA 0,237 
N.ZEALAND EXGO -0,012 -0,004 -0,005 -0,004 -0,018 -0,017 0,001 -0,011 -0,009 0,034 0,013 0,002 
NORIiA r GIEK 0,102 0,419 0,742 0,420 0,600 0,814 0,641 0,697 0,400 0,400 NA 0,538 
PORTUGAL COSEC NA -0, , 18 -0,043 -0,058 -0,085 -0,065 NA \lA NA NA !lA -0,079 
SPAIII CESCE -0,'28 -0,017 0,4'8 0,793 0,831 1,560 2,196 1,621 ',15' , ,075 0,915 1,166 
SIiEDEN EKN 0,289 0,335 0,268 0,195 0,177 0,219 0,328 0,129 0,249 0,24' 0,279 0,239 
SIIITZERL ERG 0,293 0,463 0,560 0,524 0,450 0,245 0,345 0,168 0,156 0,145 NA 0,346 
U.K1NGDOfoI EeGD 0, '36 0,419 0,826 0,986 0,776 0,907 ',156 1,153 0,860 ',199 NA 1,141 
U.S.A. FCIA -0,002 0,004 0,086 0,105 0,042 0,014 0,058 0,006 0,020 -0,005 0,010 0,030 
AVE RAGE 0,062 0,159 0,300 0,348 0,294 0,437 0,647 0,590 0,364 0,400 0,393 0,366 
NA: Not Ava; lable 
Source: Trade Finance and own c~tat;ons.
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EXPORT INSURANCE SUBSIDIES 
COON TRY AGENCY 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 AVERAGE 
AUSTRALIA EFIC 
-2,80 -2,15 -2,64 -5,39 -3,55 110,20 88,86 68,38 31,37 
AUSTRIA OKB 6,68 80,50 17,58 105,52 115,69 449,12 63,00 136,59 121,84 
BELGIUM ONO 47,89 110,78 144,39 170,30 173,80 143,15 266,03 236,09 161,55 
CANADA EDC 
-5,64 0,13 1,70 -1,68 -3,47 1,12 6,87 4,18 0,40 
DENMARK HR 28,75 36,64 36,83 51,89 tIIA tIIA NA NA 25,69 
FINLAND VlL 16,94 17 ,62 28,14 58,29 48,79 85,14 79,58 NA 47,79 
FRANCE COFACE 202,08 536,95 439,49 1166,06 2222,69 3292,46 3479,17 4373,72 1964 ,08 
GERMANY HERMES 128,54 272,59 445,39 671,49 786,55 1201,76 1870,71 2850,96 1028,50 
!TAL Y SACE 117,65 434,71 381,85 764,19 827,91 2150,27 2807,49 2982,37 1308,30 
JAPAN EID 38,39 209,16 426,50 NA NA IlA NA NA 224,68 
NETHERLD. NeM 63,34 129,20 293,56 422,07 408,31 327,67 422,86 IlA 258,lS 
N.ZEALAND EXGO -0,53 0,76 -0,50 -1,05 -0,94 -0,61 -0,46 0,87 -0,31 
NORIIAY GtEK 58,90 97,61 92,45 109,52 91,55 107,09 94,62 NA 93,11 
PORTUGAL COSEC NA -3,19 -1,94 IlA NA NA IlA NA -2,56 
SPAIN CE SCE 24,34 95,03 182,23 353,38 592,98 926,27 1191,08 995,80 545,14 
SIIEDH EKN 36,02 70,35 92,01 114,60 137,05 94,24 69,33 120,40 91,75 
S.. lTZERL. ERG 88,34 96,75 104, BB 97,30 131,01 178,79 177,17 NA 124,89 
U. KINGDOH ECG) 457,56 627,29 680,67 964,45 1236,41 1303,79 1488,62 NA 965,54 
U.S.A. FCIA 53,59 212,02 99,89 126,73 58,04 40,59 55,88 E, &E B1,95 
AVERAGE 75,56 159,09 lB2,24 303,98 401,34 6~2,41 760,05 1C7~,75 372,21 
NA: N_. t.c;12::~ 
SOurce: 1:e::E: ~;Ir',2'1Ce a~o o.n compvtat;ons. 




EXPORT INSURANCE SUBSIDIES ON INSURED EXPORTS (X) 













































DENMAR~ E~R 0,862 0,975 0,685 0,822 MA NA MA NA 0,56 
FINLAND VTL 2,130 3,059 4,342 5,427 5,751 5,886 5,197 NA 4,54 
FRANCE COFACE 0,903 1,893 1,701 3,n9 6,573 8,020 8,602 8,267 4,96 
GERMANY HERMES 1,260 2,208 3,429 4,352 5,632 6,511 7,006 7,542 4,74 
ITALY SACE 2,768 7,276 9,394 13,688 16,519 20,684 19,579 17,154 13,38 
JAPAN EID 0,092 0,406 0,871 NA MA NA NA /lA 0,46 
NETHERLD. NCM 0,896 1,934 3,196 3,324 3,146 2,031 2,010 NA 2,07 
N.2EALAND EXGO 
-0,117 0,134 -0,093 -0,159 -0,164 -0,119 -0,095 0,193 -0,05 
NORWAY GIEK 12,863 17,997 16,908 15,496 13,120 13,765 12,289 NA 14,63 
PORTUGAL COSEC IiA -0,566 -0,367 NA NA IiA IiA NA -0,47 
SPAIN CESCE 0,947 2,961 5.551 9,974 15,189 18,842 18,044 12,523 10.50 
SI/EDEN EKN 3,926 5,952 6,022 6,675 6,887 5.890 5,513 8,013 6,11 
SI/I T2ERL. ERG 5,525 7,483 7,198 8,316 11,502 10,714 10,074 NA 8,69 
U.KINGDDM ECGO 1,869 2,780 3,181 4,087 4,665 4,920 5,205 NA 3,82 
U.S.A. FCIA 0,785 2,280 2,255 1,980 1,124 0,930 1,145 0,189 1,34 
AVERA~E 2,03 3,27 3,62 4,95 5,67 6,42 6,42 5,66 4,31 
Tabl e 9b 
(lIithout Recove'ies) 
EX-ANTE 
EXPORT INSuRANCE SUBSIDIES ON TOTAL EXPORTS (%) 
CO''':,iRY A~E,CY 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 19aB 1989 1990 1991 ""ERACE 
A":STRAL lA EFl C 
-0,012 -0,010 -0,012 -0,020 -0,010 0,246 0,186 0,133 0,06 
A":STR1A eKE 0,060 0,559 0,132 0,574 0,508 1,112 0,164 0,342 0,44 
6E LG IU~, ON: 0,092 0,178 0,184 0,183 0,193 0,13:1 0,207 0,180 0, '7 
CAhADA. ECC 
-0,006 0,000 0,002 -0,001 -0,003 0,00' 0,005 0,003 o,eo 
DEN,""ARK EKR 0,203 0,215 0,157 0,181 IiA NA NA lOA C,13 
FIN~ANO VTL 0,128 0,128 0,174 0,261 0,230 0,353 0,348 IiA 0,23 
FRANCE COFACE 0,217 0,473 0,391 0,835 1,512 1.844 2,151 2,207 1,20 
GERMANY HERMES 0,083 0,128 0,165 0,200 0,259 0,280 0,273 0,430 0,23 
ITALY SACE 0,216 0.487 0,395 0,329 0,942 1,489 1,645 1,750 0,91 
JAPAN EID 0,025 0,099 0,199 NA NA NA NA NA 0, " 
NETHERLD. NCM O,oaB 0,197 0,364 0,406 0,400 0,,62 0,285 IiA C,25 
N.2EALAND EXGO -0.012 0,014 -0,009 -0,013 -0,012 -0,009 -0,004 0,008 0,00 
NORI/AY GIEK 0,309 0,990 0,845 0.868 0,656 0,496 0,442 NA 0,66 
PORTUGAL COSEC NA -0,053 -0,027 NA NA NA NA NA -0,04 
SPAIN CESCE 0,112 0,355 0,633 0,898 1,443 1,6n 2,003 1,590 1,09 
SI/EDEN EKN 0,122 0,208 0,199 0,267 0,227 0,206 0,138 0,240 0,20 
SIIIT2ERL. ERG 0,343 0,352 0,252 0,166 0,265 0,208 0,262 NA 0,27 
U.KINGDDM ECGO 0,473 0,648 0,630 0,834 0,952 0,920 1,353 I<A C,S3 
U.S.A. FCIA 0,020 0,100 0,045 0,050 0,028 0,023 0,029 0,005 0,04 
AVERAGE 0,14 0,27 0,25 0,35 0,45 0,55 0,59 0,63 0,36 
NA: Not Available 
Source: Trade Finance and own computations. 
EX-ANTE EXPORT CREDIT INSURANCE SUBSIDY WITH RECOVERIES (1964-1991) ( Values In MillIon USS) 




EXPORT INSURANCE SUBSIDIES 






















































































































































































































lra::;e Fir-tc .... ce B....c 0 .... -: c~ta~ions. 
EX'ANTE EXPORT CREDIT INSURANCE SUBSIDY WITH RECOVERIES (198401991) ( Value, a, • t of ln5ured and Total Exports) 




EXPORT INSURANCE SUBSIDIES ON INSURED 






















































































































































































































AVERAGE 1,33 2,10 2,07 2,77 3,37 4,03 4,12 3,75 2,66 




EXPORT I~SURANcE SUBSIDIES 011 TOTAL 
1984 1985 1986 1987 
EXPORTS (X) 






















































































































































































































Trade Finance and own computations. 
.._---"-"_._---~r---
TABLE 11 
EX-POST RESULTS OF EXPORT CRED IT INSURANCE IN SPAIN (Toul values In million PUs) 
(t)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
CLAIMS- CLA-PRE CLA-PRE CLA-PRE- CL-PR-RE CL-PR-RE TOTAl 
YEAR PREMIA RECOVER. CLAIMS LOSSES PREMIA l INSUR. l EXPORT RECOVER. l INSUR. l EXPORT INSUUJlCE 
1972-75 4153,2 84,9 576,3 -3661,8 -3576,9 -2,042 -0,256 -3661,8 -2,090 -0,262 175207 
1976 2b61,3 90,1 128,2 -2623,2 -2533,1 -2,467 -0,434 -2623,2 -2,555 -0,450 102670 
1977 3080,9 7,8 325,4 -2763,3 -2755,S -2,080 -0,355 -2763,3 -2,086 -0,356 132495 
1978 3026,7 17,2 790,5 -2253,4 -2236,2 -1,451 -0,223 -2253,4 -1,462 -0,225 15"66 
1979 3040,6 151,7 1545,0 -1647,3 -1495,6 -1,024 -0,122 -1647,3 -1,128 -0,135 146028 
1980 4917,8 994,43 4790,7 -1121,S - 127,1 -0,057 -0,009 -1121,S -0,501 -0,075 224027 
1981 7550,9 952,2 5136,8 -33b6,3 -2414,1 -0,473 -0,128 -3366,3 -0,660 -0,178 509917 
1982 13527,6 4308,3 13031,5 -4804,4 -496,1 -0,074 -0,022 -4804,4 -0,712 -0,213 674960 
1983 8058,4 5674,6 19935,6 6202,6 11877,2 1,934 0,418 6202,6 1,010 0,219 614142 
1984 7129,2 6195,6 37052,5 23727,7 29923,3 5,030 0,802 23727,7 3,988 0,636 594950 
1985 9753,2 16148,6 43894,5 17992,7 34141,3 5,296 0,832 17992,7 2,791 0,438 644620 
1986 6673,7 17315,1 65950,9 41962,1 59277,2 10,585 1,559 41962,1 7,493 1,104 55~ 
1987 3225,0 16154,1 97325 I , . 77946,0 94100,1 18,346 2,243 77946,0 15,197 1,858 512920 
1988 5567,3 27028,1 81043,4 - 48448,0 75476,1 12,236 1,611 48448,0 7,854 1,034 616857 
1989 5145,0 15223,2 66011,9 45643,7 60866,9 9,626 1,158 45643,7 7,219 0,868 632312 
1990 8715,6 18881,0 68948,7 41352,1 60233,1 6,616 1,067 41352,1 4,542 0,733 910419 
199' 151'9,8 20157,7 69296,1 34018,6 54176,3 5,668 0,870 34018,6 3,559 0,546 9558al 
1992 10372,4 48217,6 76246,2 17656,2 65873,8 7,852 0,9,7 17656,2 2,105 0,267 838915 
1GTA~ 121718,6 197602,2 652029,3 332708,5 530310,7 5,892 ,919332708,5 3,697 0,577 9000475 
A~·E",~~E 
'973-77 16~ 9,2 30,S 171,7 -1508,1 -1477,6 -2,160 -0,322 -1508,1 -2,205 -0,328 68395 
<;78-82 6~12,7 1284,8 5058,9 -2638,6 -1353,8 -0,396 -0,056 -2638,6 -0,772 -0,168 341820 
1953-87 6907,9 12297,6 52831,7 335b6,2 45563,8 7,836 1,228 335b6,2 5,735 0,899 585324 
1958-92 8;&';,0 25901,5 72309,3 37423,7 63325,2 8,007 0,932 37423,7 4,732 0,551 790877 
(1) I~s~ra~ce's Preffiium (year t) 
(2) Reccveries (year t) 
(3) Claims (year t) 
(4) Operational results in year t (Loss = Claims-Premia-Recoveries) 
(5) Claims-Premia (year t) 
(6) CLaims-Premia as a percentage of Export Credit Insurance (~) 
(7) Claims-Premia as 8 percentage of Total Exports (~) 
(8) Claims-Premia-Recoveries (year t) 
(9) Claims-Premia-Recoveries 8S percentage of Export Credit Insurance 
(10) Claims-Premia-Recoveries 8S percentage of Total Exports (~) 
(11) Total Export Insurance (year t) 
Source: Own Computations based on CESCE's Annual Repports 
TABLE 1,. 
EX-POST RESULTS OF EXPORT CREDIT INSURANCE IN SPAIN (Politicll risks on Stlte'. Account) (VI lues in Million Ptas.) 
(t)  ( 1) (2) (3) (4 ) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11 ) 
CLAIMS- CLA-PRE CLA-PRE CLA-PRE- CL-PR-RE CL-PR-RE STATE 
YEAR PREMIA RECOVER. CLAIMS lOSSES PREMIA X INSUR. X EXPORT RECOVER. X INSUR. X EXPORT IIIS\JUllC. 
1972-75 2951,2 64,8 520,2 -2495,8 -2431,0 -2,404 -0,174 -2495,8 -2,468 -0,179 101123 
1976 2065,8 0,0 43,2 -2022,6 -2022,6 -3,291 -0,347 -2022,6 -3,291 -0,347 61452 
1977 2480,4 7,8 168,1 -2320,1 -2312,3 -2,862 -0,298 -2320,1 -2,8n -0,299 80785 
1978 2361,0 17,2 369,8 -2008,3 -1991,2 -2,203 -0,199 -2008,3 -2,222 -0,201 903n 
1979 2075,3 37,8 1109,S -1003,6 -965,8 -1,234 -0,079 -1003,6 -1,282 -0,082 78261 
1980 3622,3 475,7 3264,0 -834,0 -358,3 -0,273 -0,024 -834,03 -0,636 •0,056 131116 
1981 5826,3 412,2 3465,7 -2n2,8 -2360,6 -0,645 -0,125 -2n2,8 -0,757 -0,147 366200 
1982 12271,0 4212,5 11804,1 -4679,4 -466,9 -0,085 -0,021 -4679,4 -0,852 -0,207 549300 
1983 6134,3 5431,9 17935,8 6369,6 11801,5 2,601 0,416 6369,6 1,404 0,224 45l800 
19&4 5448,1 5882,1 35573,2 24243,0 30125,1 7,138 0,807 24243,0 5,744 0,650 422064 
1985 8634,1 15420,1 42151,3 18097,1 33517,2 7,190 0,817 18097,1 3,882 0,441 466160 
1986 5035,7 16520,9 63017,6 41461,0 57981,9 14,400 1,525 41461,0 10,297 1,091 402659 
1987 1883,0 15576,2 90602,5 73143,3 88719,5 24,473 2,115 73143,3 20,176 1,743 362523 
1988 3880,7 24846,3 74833,7 46106,7 70953,0 16,603 1,514 46106,7 10,789 0,984 427343 
1989 3512,4 14707,6 64029,7 45809,7 60517,3 14,057 1,151 45809,7 10,640 0,871 430527 
1990 6514,6 18595,4 67344,9 42234,9 60830,3 9,426 1,078 42234,9 6,544 0,748 645368 
1991 13023,0 19652,4 67549,9 34874,5 54526,9 7,884 0,876 34874,5 5,042 0,560 6916« 
1992 8026,7 47857,5 74557,7 18673,5 66531,0 11,969 1,007 18673,5 3,359 0,283 555872 
lC7AL 95746 189718 618341 332877 522595 8,273 0,906 3328n 5,270 0,577 6316569 
,L'~:E~A::E 
1973·77 1249,6 12,1 121,9 -1139,8 '1127,7 '2,780 - 0,245 -1139,8 '2,810 '0,248 40560 
1978·82 5231,2 1031,1 4002,6 ·2259,6 '1228,6 -0,505 -0,078 -2259,6 -0,930 '0,144 243:50 
1983-87 5427,0 11766,2 49856,1 32662,8 44429,0 10,542 1,190 32662,8 7,750 0,875 421441 
19::-92 699',5 25131,8 69663,2 37539,9 62671,7 11,392 0,922 37539,9 6,824 0,552 550151 
(1 ) Jns~ra~ce's Premium (year t) 
(2 ) ~ecc.eries (year t) 
(3) Claims (year t) 
(4 ) Operational results in year t (Loss: Claims'Premia'Recoveries) 
(5 ) Claims'Premia (year t) 
(6) Claims'Premia as a percentage of E~port Credit Insurance (X) 
(7) Claims' Premia as a percentage of Total E~ports (X) 
(B) Claims-Premia-Recoveries (yelr t) 
(9) Claims-Premla'Recoveries IS percentage of E~port Credit Insurlnce 
(10) Cllims·Premil·Recoverles IS percentlge of Total E~ports (X) 
( 11 ) Total E~port Insurance (year t) 
Source: Own Computations based on CESCE's Annual Repports 
TABLE 11b 
EX-POST RESULTS OF EXPORT CREDIT INSURANCE IN SPAIN (Conmercl,l rllks on CESCE'I Account) (V,lues In Million Pte•• ) 
(t) (1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
CLAIMS- CLA-PRE CLA-PRE CLA-PRE- CL-PR-RE CL-PR-RE CESCE 
YEAR PREMIA RECOVER. CLAIMS LOSSES PREMIA X INSUR. X EXPORT RECOVER. X INSUR. X EXPORT IIISURANCE 
1972-75 1202,0 20,1 56,0 -1166,1 -1146,0 -1,547. -0,082 -1166,1 -1,574 -0,083 74084 
1976 595,5 0,0 85,1 -510,4 -510,4 -1,238 -0,087 -510,4 -1,238 -0,087 41218 
1977 600,5 0,0 157,3 -443,2 -443,2 -0,857 -0,057 -443,2 -0,857 -0,057 51710 
1978 665,7 0,0 420,7 -245,0 -245,0 -0,384 -0,024 -245,0 -0,384 -0,024 63794 
1979 965,3 113,9 435,5 -643,7 -529,8 -0,782 -0,043 -643,7 -0,950 -0,053 61767 
1980 1295,5 518,7 1526,7 -1166,0 231,2 0,249 0,015 -287,5 -0,309 -0,019 92911 
1981 1724,6 540,0 167',1 -593,5 -53,5 -0,037 -0,003 -593,5 -0,413 -0,031 143717 
1982 '256,6 95,8 '227,4 -125,0 -29,2 -0,023 -0,00' -125,0 -0,099 -0,006 125660 
1983 1924,1 242,7 1999,8 -167,0 75,7 0,047 0,003 -167,0 -0,104 -0,006 160342 
1984 1681,1 313,5 1479,3 -515,3 -201,8 -0,117 -0,005 -515,3 -0,298 -0,014 172887 
1985 1119,1 728,5 1743,2 -104,4 624,1 0,350 0,015 - 104,4 -0,059 -0,003 178460 
1986 1638,0 794,2 2933,3 50',1 1295,3 0,823 0,034 501,1 0,318 0,013 157332 
1987 1342,0 577,9 6722,6 4802,7 5380,6 3,578 0,128 4802,7 3,193 0,114 150397 
1985 16&,6 2181,8 6209,7 2341,3 4523,1 2,387 0,097 2341,3 1,235 0,050 1895 14 
1989 1632,6 515,6 1982,2 -166,0 349,6 0,173 0,007 -166,0 -0,082 -0,003 201786 
1990 2201,0 285,6 1603,8 -882,8 -597,2 -0,225 -0,011 -882,8 -0,333 -0,016 265051 
1991 2096,8 505,3 1746,2 -855,9 -350,6 -0,133 -0,006 -855,9 -0,324 -0,014 264237 
19;2 23~5.7 360,1 1688,5 -1017,3 -657,2 -0,232 -0,010 - 101 7,3 -0,359 -0,0'5 283043 
Tc: ~ ~ 25973 7794 33688 -956 7716 0,287 0,013 -78 -0,003 0,000 2683907 
.t •:; t.: ~ 
1973·77 399,7 3,4 49,7 '353,3 -349,9 -1,257 -0,076 -353,3 -1,269 -0,077 27835 
1y~c'c2 118 ~ ,5 253,7 1056,3 ·~54,6 -125,3 -0,127 -0,008 -378,9 -0)84 -0,024 98770 
1983.87 15':':,9 531,4 2975,6 983,4 1434,8 0,875 0,038 903,4 0,551 0,024 163883 
19EE·92 ';;2,5 769,7 2646,1 - 116,1 653,5 0,271 0,010 -116,1 -0,048 -0,002 240725,9 
(1 ) J~;.'a~ce's Precium (year t) 
(2 ) F.e::cye:""~es (year t) 
(3) Claims (year t) 
(4 ) Operat iona t results in year t (Loss = Claims-Premia-Recoveries) 
CS) Claims-premia (year t) 
(6) Claims-Premia as a percentage of Export Credit Insurance (X) 
( 7) Claims'Premia as a percentage of Total Exports (X) 
(8) Claims'Premia-Recoveries (year t) 
(9) Claims,premia-Recoveries as percentage of Export Credit Insurance 
(10) Claims-Premia-Recoveries as percentage of Total Exports (X) 
( 11) 10tal hport Insurance (year t) 
Source: O~n Computations based on CESCE's Annual Repports 
._•......_.__ .._---_._.._---------------------
EX-POST PERFORMANCE OF EXPORT CREDIT INSURANCE IN FRANCE (Values In Million FF end/or percentages) 
TABLE 12 
EX-POST RESULTS OF EXPORT CREDIT INSURANCE IN FRANCE EX-POST RESULTS OF EXPORT CREDIT INSURANCE IN F~CE 
(Political Risks on State's Account) (c~rcl.l Risks on COFACE Account)(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
X TOTAL INSURAN. CLAIMS- CLA-PRE TOTAL CLAIMS-~ IMSURAN. CLA-PRE 
YEAR INSURAN. PREMIA X INSUR. YEAR INSURAM. PREMIA ~ INSUR. 
1973 41,0 12,8 -n,o -0,60 1973 59,0 0,0 0,0 -0,21
1974 32,0 19,3 -17,4 
-0,09 1974 68,0 -792,9 1903,1 -0,24
1975 18,0 16,7 1,7 0,01 1975 82,0 -418,5 878,9 -0,21
1976 18,0 20,7 -20,7 
-0,10 1976 82,0 -363,4 799,5 -0,22
1977 17,0 25,9 -80,4 
-0,31 19n 83,0 -203,4 467,7 -0,23
1978 21,0 29,0 211,6 0,13 1978 79,0 -508,5 864,5 -0,17
1979 24,0 35,2 764,5 2,17 1979 76,0 -218,5 437,0 
-0,20
1980 25,0 42,0 785,4 1,87 1980 75,0 -445,1 645,7 -0,19
1981 24,0 49,6 660,1 1,33 1981 76,0 -95,0 161,5 '0,17
1982 21,0 52,0 1149,6 2,21 1982 79,0 -131,9 224,3 -0,17
1983 NA NA NA NA 1983 MA NA MA NA 
1984 24,0 72,5 1739,5 2,40 1984 76,0 -79,3 134,9 -0,17
1985 26,0 n,2 1745,8 2,26 1985 81,0 405,9 -649,4 -0,16
1986 30,0 80,9 3988,9 4,93 1986 70,0 3361,9 -2689,S -0,08
1987 42,0 89,8 11359,2 12,65 1987 58,0 1358,0 -1765,3 -0,13
1988 41,8 84,2 20160,0 23,93 1988 58,2 -96,6 -190,0 0,20
1989 41,4 113,0 21011,0 18,59 1989 58,6 -517,3 -274,0 0,05
1998 39,3 103,0 20063,0 19,48 1990 60,7 
-519,5 -260,0 0,05
1991 36,8 110,0 16376,0 14,89 1991 63,2 -642,9 -350,0 0,05 
A'~·f. ~AGE AVERAGE 
73'77 2;,2 19,1 -38,8 -0,22 13-77 74,8 
-355,7 809,8 -0,22
78'82 23,0 41,6 714,2 1,66 78·82 n,o -279,8 506,6 -0,18
83'87 3C',5 80,1 4708,3 5,56 83-87 71,3 1261,6 -1242,3 -0,14
85·91 39,8 102,6 19402,5 19,22 88-91 60,2 -444,1 
-268,5 0,09 
~~ ~~t Available 
(1) Percentage of insured contracts covered from Political (Commercial) risks. 
(2) Total Insured Contracts (Billion FF) 
(3) Subsidy ~ithout recoveries (Claims-Premia) in Hi Il ion FF 
(4 ) Claims-Premia as e % of Insured Exports for Political (Commercial) risks. 
